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ZERO-SUM MADISON 
Thomas W. Merrill* 
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTION-
ALISM. By Jennifer Nedelsky. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
1990. Pp. xiii, 343. $29.95. 
Has the fabric of American constitutional law been permanently 
"distorted" by the Framers' preoccupation with protecting private 
property against redistribution? Jennifer Nedelsky1 thinks so. In this 
provocative study of how the idea of property shaped the political 
thought of the Framers and the institutions they designed, she argues 
that James Madison's constitutional philosophy was driven by fear 
that a future propertyless majority would seek to expropriate the hold-
ings of a minority. To combat this danger, Madison sought to create a 
structure of government that would ensure the dominance of the prop-
ertied elite. Madison's obsessive fear of redistribution spread to the 
newly created federal judiciary, which elevated private property to the 
status of a legal "boundary" limiting the political power of majorities. 
Although judicial protection of property has waned in recent decades, 
Nedelsky believes that Madison's legacy continues to limit our ability 
to construct a more egalitarian and participatory constitutional order. 
Nedelsky's thesis suffers from a double hyperbole: she both over-
states and understates the role of property in American public life. In 
explaining the past, she overstates the extent to which a constitutional-
ized property has served as a barrier to a more communitarian or egal-
itarian polity. Indeed, much of her analysis rests on a play on what it 
means to "redistribute property." Although the historical record 
reveals that Madison wanted the Constitution to protect specific rights 
in property and contract from retroactive impairment, it does not sup-
port the far more drastic proposition that Madison thought property 
in the sense of shares of general wealth should be frozen. The domi-
nant pattern in judicial protection of property has similarly been to 
require government compensation for interference with "distinct in-
vestment-backed expectations,"2 but not to bar efforts to redistribute 
general wealth. Thus, constitutionalized property has at most im-
peded attempts at targeted interference; it has not posed any barrier to 
systemic redistribution. 
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University. B.A. 1971, Grinnell College; B.A. 1973, Ox-
ford University; J.D. 1977, University of Chicago. - Ed. 
1. Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Toronto. 
2. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978). 
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In the evaluative chapter that concludes the book (pp. 203-76), on 
the other hand, Nedelsky badly understates the positive contributions 
private property makes, especially its role in generating greater mate-
rial wealth. This chapter is devoid of any acknowledgment of the 
powerful utilitarian case for a system of private property. The omis-
sion is especially glaring given that utilitarian considerations weighed 
heavily in the minds of Madison and his fellow Federalists as they 
tried to correct the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation. 
Nedelsky's failure to consider the additional material prosperity intro-
duced by a system of private property means that, if anything, her own 
account of the Madisonian Constitution is "distorted": constitutional 
protection for private property is far easier to attack in a zero-sum 
society than in a world where private property creates incentives that 
encourage a better life for all. A more balanced assessment would 
view property as a more modest barrier to majoritarian action and 
more generously credit the institution's positive contributions. 
I 
Nedelsky tells a story that is carefully developed, attentively de-
tailed, and thoughtfully supported. Especially in the foundational 
chapters devoted to the political thought of Madison (pp. 16-66) and 
two other prominent Federalists - Gouverneur Morris (pp. 67-95) 
and James Wilson (pp. 96-140) - she presents a richly textured ac-
count of the Federalist understanding of property and its relation to 
democratic theory. What follows is necessarily a simplified version of 
her argument, designed to highlight my points of disagreement. 
In Nedelsky's view, the single most important aspect of Madison's 
political philosophy - and the key to understanding the undemo-
cratic features of our Constitution - is the little-known fact that he 
was a Malthusian (pp. 18, 33-34, 54-55). Madison believed that as the 
population of America grew and the vast expanses of the West filled 
up, eventually large numbers of people would be forced off the land 
into positions of wage labor.3 Competition among these landless la-
borers would drive wages down to the point where "a great majority of 
the people will not only be without landed, but any other sort of, 
property. "4 
Given this gloomy prospect, Madison foresaw serious conflict 
ahead between the political rights of the property less majority and the 
civil rights of minorities, especially their right to private property. 
Sooner or later, the majority would seek to use its political power to 
3. See Letter from James Madison to Nicholas P. Trist (Jan. 29, 1828), reprinted in MARVIN 
MEYERS, THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 453-55 (1973) (criticizing utopian communities such as 
Owen's New Harmony for overlooking the Malthusian dynamic). 
4. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION OF 1787, at 203-04 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911) (statement by Madison). 
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plunder the property of the wealthy few. Nedelsky suggests that 
Madison was particularly concerned about the expropriatory yearn-
ings of the future Malthusian mob because he thought it would spell 
the doom of all civil liberties (p. 38). Madison believed that unequal 
shares of property resulted ultimately from unequal faculties for ob-
taining property (such as intelligence and industry) (pp. 28-29), and 
thus egalitarian redistribution could be achieved only by suppressing 
free exercise of the faculties themselves (p. 38). 
In one of the book's strongest sections, Nedelsky develops the vari-
ous strategies that Madison might have adopted for staving off the 
confrontation between majority rule and private property (pp. 141-63). 
Madison's solution, according to Nedelsky, was to try to rig the rules 
of majoritarian politics under the Constitution to ensure that those 
who actually ruled would be members of the property-owning elite 
(pp. 50-52). This explains Madison's desire for property qualifications 
for electors to the Senate, his endorsement of a Council of Revision 
composed in part of unelected judges, and his development of theories 
of horizontally and vertically divided and checked government in or-
der to filter and dilute majority will. Madison believed that as long as 
the propertied minority enjoyed disproportionate influence in the 
political arena of the new Republic, they would guard against the folly 
of seeking to undermine the security of property rights. 
Nedelsky points out that other strategies were available to 
Madison. Gouverneur Morris, who was less of a democrat than 
Madison, wanted to check not only the future propertyless majority 
but also the propertied elite. Otherwise, the danger of majority tyr-
anny would be avoided only at the cost of minority tyranny. Madison 
was so focused on the danger of majority expropriation, however, that 
he gave insufficient attention to this possibility in 1787. James Wilson, 
on the other hand, was more optimistic about the future of democracy, 
and wanted to encourage greater participation in government by all 
citizens. Active participation would lead to a greater sense of respon-
sibility, which in the long run would provide greater security for prop-
erty. Obsessed with the image of the future majority as a hungry mob, 
Madison failed to consider this path as well, opting instead for a gov-
ernment structured to encourage political apathy. Thus, the Madis-
onian solution contained within it the seeds of what Nedelsky sees as 
the major failing of modem constitutionalism: its hostility towards 
measures designed to promote more equality and a more genuinely 
participatory democracy. 
Nedelsky acknowledges but does not highlight two immediate diffi-
culties in showing that Madison's political philosophy (as she has de-
picted it) played a dominating role in American constitutionalism. 
First, Madison's Malthusian premise turned out to be false. Although 
there has always been considerable inequality in property ownership in 
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America, the grim vision of a permanent propertyless majority never 
materialized (p. 331 n.188). Second, Madison's strategy for meeting 
the imagined Malthusian danger was never implemented in its in-
tended form. The Convention rejected some Madisonian devices to 
ensure rule by a propertied elite - such as a property qualification for 
electors to the Senate (pp. 56-57, 303 n.5); others went by the board as 
the franchise and tenets· of populist democracy expanded throughout 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, Nedelsky argues that "the pri-
macy of the Federalist concern with protecting property so shaped the 
structure of the Constitution that it was characterized.as much by this 
implicit priority as by the absence of its formal institutionalization" (p. 
7). The Madisonian obsession lived on, she argues, largely through 
the development of the institution of judicial review. The Federalist 
judiciary divided the issues of public life into the conceptual realms of 
politics and law, granting themselves final say over the latter. Prop-
erty rights, which enjoyed "the sanction of the long and honorable 
tradition of common law" (p. 8), quickly became a legally enforced 
limit on the power of democratic government. The phenomenon ini-
tially emerged through aggressive enforcement of the Contracts 
Clause5 and later expanded through a Lochner-ized due process. 6 
Ironically therefore, although Madison himself opposed judicial re-
view (p. 59), it was the device through which his fear of majoritarian 
redistribution was perpetuated for the first 150 years under the Ameri-
can Constitution. 
At this point in Nedelsky's story, another obvious difficulty devel-
ops: in the late 1930s the Court abandoned Lochner, and has made no 
systematic effort to revive it (at least with respect to property rights) 
since that time. While Nedelsky acknowledges this (p. 225), shear-
gues that the Madisonian-Lochnerian legacy continues to rule us from 
the grave. In fact, she believes the preoccupation with protecting 
property against majoritarian redistribution has permanently "dis-
torted" constitutional discourse in a number of ways. Because of the 
Madisonian legacy, we tend to think of constitutional rights as inher-
ently unequal (like property) rather than capable of enjoyment by all 
(pp. 245-46). Additionally, Madison's efforts to impose filters on the 
vox populi through federalism and separation of powers generated our 
"shallow conception" of democracy (p. 1 ), minimizing the potential 
for participation in government by all segments of society. Finally, 
our chronic tendency to view private property as the paradigm of con-
stitutional rights has stymied efforts to find a new foundation for con-
stitutional protection of interests in personal autonomy - a 
5. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10. 
6. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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foundation that would be more congenial to claims of egalitarian re-
distribution {pp. 272-76). 
II 
Numerous problems beset Nedelsky's reconstruction of Madison's 
views about property and their influence on American constitutional-
ism. 7 Probably the principal defect is that she mistakenly conflates 
two very different positions regarding constitutional protection of 
property: (1) that specific rights in property should be protected 
against majority interference, and (2) that relative shares of general 
wealth should be insulated from collective redistribution. Madison 
clearly agreed with the former proposition, but I think it most unlikely 
that he would have endorsed the latter. By treating these two proposi-
tions as equivalent, Nedelsky has in effect transformed Madison into 
Stephen Field8 - or Richard Epstein.9 She has also erroneously por-
trayed what is in effect a minority position in American constitutional 
law (the Field-Epstein strict antiredistribution view) as the main line. 
Without a doubt, Madison wanted to protect specific rights in 
property and contract. He endorsed the Contracts Clause - prohibit-
ing the states from impairing the obligation of contracts - on the 
ground that it would help "inspire a general prudence and industry, 
and give a regular course to the business of society."10 And he is gen-
erally credited as the author of the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment - barring the federal government from taking private 
property for public use without just compensation (p. 308 n.56). But 
no evidence exists that Madison harbored similar hostility toward 
measures that would redistribute relative shares of fungible wealth. 
Madison favored abolition of the entail in Virginia {p. 285 n.53) and 
7. Two problems of misplaced emphasis should be briefly noted. First, Nedelsky gives insuf· 
ficient attention to Madison's concerns about conflicts between different classes of property hold· 
ers - debtor versus creditor, agrarian versus manufacturing, slaveholder versus independent 
farmer. These concerns probably weighed more heavily on his mind than any concerns about 
rich versus poor. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison); James Madison, Draft 
Letter on Majority Governments Dated 1833, reprinted in MEYERS, supra note 3, at 521-30. 
Second, Nedelsky should have done more to acknowledge Madison's strong commitment to free-
dom of speech and religion as well as property. In this regard, I agree with Nedelsky that 
Madison's 1792 essay entitled Property, id. at 243, is uncharacteristic in defining property very 
broadly to include what we would call civil rights. But in asserting that every "man has a prop· 
erty in his opinions and the free communication of them," and "a property of peculiar value in 
his religious opinions, and in the profession and practice dictated by them," id., Madison was 
making the point that freedom of speech and religion were just as important as the right to 
property. By downplaying Madison's commitment to these other rights, Nedelsky makes him 
seem excessively single-minded. 
8. Justice Field was the foremost advocate of the doctrine of substantive due process in the 
period leading up to Lochner. See JAMES W. ELY, THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 
86-87, 92, 99 (1992). 
9. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN (1985). 
10. THE FEDERALISf No. 44 (James Madison). 
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spoke favorably of other reforms in the laws of inheritance that would 
tend to equalize the distribution of property over time (p. 39). As 
Nedelsky admits, "[p]oor laws were common in most states, including 
Virginia, and we have some reason to believe that Madison approved 
of such institutions" (p. 44). She also quotes Madison as having once 
expressed the· view that France could benefit from "a more equal parti-
tion of property" (p. 34). 
More direct evidence of his attitude is provided by his 1792 essay 
Parties, where Madison wrote that the evil of party factions should be 
combatted by, among other things, "the silent operation of laws, 
which, without violating the rights of property, reduce extreme wealth 
towards a state of mediocrity."11 Here we see Madison relying on the 
very distinction Nedelsky repeatedly ignores - between "rights of 
property" (not to be violated) and measures to reduce extremes in 
wealth (to be encouraged). 
Perhaps the strongest reason to doubt Nedelsky's equating specific 
property rights with general wealth, however, is that it would have 
been illogical for Madison to oppose general wealth redistribution, 
given the premises of his political thought as Nedelsky portrays them. 
Madison believed in economic growth: he wanted a government that 
would encourage agricultural improvements, advances in manufactur-
ing, and more trade and commerce, all of which he regarded as pro-
moting the "public good" (pp. 42-43). Yet at several junctures in his 
life Madison also voiced a Malthusian pessimism: no amount of 
growth could keep up with the demands of a burgeoning population, 
so that over time more and more Americans would be without any 
property. 
Given these twin premises - a belief that the size of the pie could 
be expanded together with a belief that the distribution of the pie 
would eventually become so skewed as to threaten the very fabric of 
society - Madison could not sensibly oppose all forms of redistribu-
tion. Instead, one would expect Madison to endorse both economic 
growth and wealth redistribution (as long as measures to achieve one 
goal would not frustrate the other), because both measures would 
work to postpone the day of the Malthusian Armageddon. The most 
plausible position for realizing this dual strategy would be to secure 
existing entitlements against retroactive impairment - thereby stimu-
lating investment and economic growth - while encouraging meas-
ures that would work over time to promote greater equality in wealth. 
Nedelsky cites no evidence suggesting this was not in fact Madison's 
position.12 
11. P. 45 (quoting James Madison, Parties, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 86 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906)) (emphasis added). 
12. When listing examples of the evils of factions, Madison spoke of "a rage for paper money, 
for an abolition of debts, [or] for an equal division of property .... " THE FEDERALIST, supra 
note 7, at 112. But I would not equate "an equal division of property,'' i.e., pure socialism, with 
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By and large, our constitutional history has followed the same 
strategy: we protect specific contract and property rights against ret-
rospective interference but do not recognize any permanent or general 
barriers to wealth redistribution. Consider, for example, the Contracts 
Clause. It is true, as Nedelsky argues, that the Federalist judiciary 
adopted an expansive interpretation of the Contracts Clause, reading it 
to cover much that could be regarded as property. 13 But in the water-
shed case of Ogden v. Saunders, 14 the Court limited the clause to the 
protection of previously negotiated contract rights, holding that it did 
not bar prospective legislation such as bankruptcy laws designed to 
mitigate hardship for future insolvent debtors. A reading of the Con-
stitution that would proscribe all attempts at wealth redistribution 
would presumably reach the opposite conclusion. ts 
Similarly, Madison's Takings Clause has always been understood 
to apply only to interference with rights in specific property.16 The 
Clause requires the government to pay just compensation when it con-
demns, seizes, or destroys identifiable property. It also requires just 
compensation when the government adopts a regulation of property 
that has the effect of "appropriating or destroying it."17 But the Court 
has consistently rejected takings challenges to general price regula-
tions, 18 zoning regulations, 19 or systems of taxation.20 This is again 
contrary to what one would expect if the Constitution truly enjoined 
measures designed to achieve a "more equal" division, which Madison endorsed. Nedelsky also 
notes that Jefferson once wrote Madison proposing an equal division of property among siblings 
upon death ofa parent and a system of progressive taxation, and that Madison did not reply. P. 
33. She infers from Madison's failure to respond that he disapproved of these ideas, but she cites 
no direct evidence supporting such a conclusion. P. 285 n.51. 
13. Pp. 194-95. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (Contracts Clause pro-
hibits state interference with completed grant of real property); Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (Contracts Clause protects corporate charter). 
14. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). Nedelsky does not cite the case. 
15. See Richard Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 
703, 723-30 (1984) (arguing that Ogden was wrongly decided and that prospective interferences 
with freedom of contract should be construed to violate the clause). 
16. The Takings Clause has in fact been of limited significance throughout most of our his-
tory. The Supreme Court held in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), that the 
clause applied only to the federal government, and not until late in the nineteenth century did the 
Court find that the principles of the clause applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). Even as applied to 
the federal government, not until 1946 did the Court clearly establish that federal sovereign 
immunity had been waived for suits alleging a taking of property. United States v. Causby, 328 
U.S. 256 (1946). See JOHN M. STEADMAN ET AL., LmGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERN· 
MENT 225-26 (2d ed. 1983). 
17. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922). 
18. See Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (rent controls). 
19. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
20. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (dictum); cf. 
United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52 (1989) (rejecting takings challenge to imposition of a 
user fee on persons litigating claims before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal). 
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all forms of wealth redistribution.21 
Even in the area of procedural due process protections for prop-
erty, we see a similar pattern. In an important pair of cases decided 
early in this century, the Court held that a due process hearing was 
required where "[a] relatively small number of persons was concerned, 
who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual 
grounds."22 But where the question involved establishing a general 
schedule of tax rates applicable to large numbers of similarly situated 
individuals, "[t]heir rights are protected in the only way that they can 
be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over 
those who make the rule."23 Thus, the Due Process Clause, like the 
Contracts and Takings Clauses, applies to targeted intrusions, not 
wholesale redistribution. 
To be sure, the substantive due process jurisprudence of Lochner 
can be seen as reflecting a general hostility toward redistributive legis-
lation, even where the law operates prospectively and thus cannot be 
said to interfere with specific, preexisting entitlements. But Lochner 
had a much narrower scope of operation than is often assumed. For 
the most part, its theory was confined to statutes that precluded par-
ties to a contractual relationship, such as employers and employees, 
from bargaining over specific terms. 24 Substantive due process was 
never applied to prohibit progressive taxation, public assistance laws, 
or any other general redistributive legislation. And even in the em-
ployer-employee context, the Court often upheld statutes where it per-
ceived that employees did not enjoy equal bargaining power. 25 In any 
event, the Lochner era lasted only forty years and is now thoroughly 
repudiated. 
In sum, Nedelsky significantly overstates the degree to which the 
Constitution, either in its original design or in its evolved understand-
ing, has served to entrench the ~xisting distribution of wealth. The 
main line in American constitutional history, from James Madison to 
the present, has been to offer a measure of constitutional protection for 
specific entitlements in property but not to freeze relative shares of 
wealth. By conflating these two positions, Nedelsky has painted a pic-
ture of a constitutional tradition far more hostile to egalitarian redis-
21. Richard Epstein, who believes that the Constitution ought to incorporate such a princi-
ple, accordingly argues that the Takings Clause should be construed to prohibit progressive taxa-
tion and other forms of redistribution. EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 295-303. 
22. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915) (characteriz-
ing the holding in Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908)). 
23. 239 U.S. at 445. 
24. See Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: 
United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 LAW & HIST. REv. 249, 274 (1987) (describing ten-
sion between paternalism and anti-redistribution theme during Lachner era). 
25. E.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (minimum hours for women); Holden v. 
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (minimum hours for miners). 
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tribution than the one we have. If Americans have not sought to 
legislate socialism, it is because the political consensus for such a solu-
tion does not exist. It is not because of the legacy of Mr. Madison or 
because of any legal barriers found in the Constitution. 
III 
If Nedelsky overstates the degree of constitutional protection given 
to property in the analytical portion of the book, she is guilty of under-
stating the contributions of property when she puts an evaluative spin 
on that analysis in the concluding chapter. In common with other 
recent works on property rights by left-leaning American academics,26 
Nedelsky's normative analysis is concerned exclusively with issues of 
distributive justice - how we cut the pie. Nedelsky ignores the possi-
bility that the institution of private property might have something to 
do with the size of the pie, and hence with the well-being of those who 
receive even the smallest slices, whatever the distributional principle. 
In effect, she evaluates the Madisonian legacy (in the overblown form 
in which she presents it) against an implicit assumption of a zero-sum 
society. Not surprisingly, a private property regime looks quite unfair 
on such assumptions: those with property get much larger slices of the 
pie than those without, just because they already have property. The 
only decent thing to do is to start redistributing. 
This focus on distributive justice gives rise to a number of ironies. 
One is that Madison and his compatriots surely did not believe in a 
zero-sum society, as Nedelsky herself admits (p. 42). Indeed, in the 
analytical part of the book, Nedelsky acknowledges that Madison 
wanted to protect property in part to promote economic growth -
what he called the "public good." The Madison we encounter in the 
analytical pages is a complex figure who believes in an expanding pie 
but frets about a Malthusian future in which a majority hold only mi-
nuscule slices. When it comes to evaluating the Madisonian legacy, 
however, the pro-growth theme drops from sight and we are left with 
nothing but the demand of a minority (the rich) for protection against 
a majority (the poor). Needless to say, in a such zero-sum world it is 
hard to find kind words for a Constitution that forbids any redistribu-
tion of wealth. 
At only one point in the book does Nedelsky seek to justify her 
disregard of the wealth-generating potential of private property. She 
acknowledges that if Madison were right about the sanctity of private 
property as necessary to "promote the public good of all," then "most 
of the criticisms I have outlined would fall or at least pale before 
them" (p. 168). In reply to this challenge, she asserts that in order to 
26. See, e.g., STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY (1990); JEREMY WALDRON, 
THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988). I make a similar point about Munzer's work in 
Thomas W. Merrill, Wealth and Property, 38 UCLA L. REv. 489, 495 (1990) (book review). 
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believe Madison was right, "[w]e must accept both the claim that at-
tempts at redistribution will make those at the bottom worse off and 
the claim that they will not be capable of seeing this 'truth' for them-
selves. If either claim fails, the moral foundation for Madisonian elite 
rule crumbles" (pp. 168-69). This response rests on the same equivo-
cation previously noted: Nedelsky equates Madison's support for spe-
cific investments in property (needed to promote "the public good," 
i.e., a larger pie) with a policy against all wealth redistribution. To 
imagine that "those at the bottom" are made worse off by progressive 
rates of taxation and transfer payments, and that they cannot see this 
themselves, is indeed implausible. But this does not mean that "those 
at the bottom" would be better off if we abolished private property or 
even if we did away with the Due Process and Takings Clauses. The 
poorest Americans may not want to eliminate redistribution, but they 
are not lining up to flee to Cuba either. 
Which brings me to a second irony. Shortly after Nedelsky pub-
lished her book, private property had the best year in its history. Dur-
ing 1991, the world watched transfixed as the former communist states 
of eastern Europe turned from collectivist to market-oriented regimes 
and then communist rule collapsed even in the Soviet Union. The 
phenomenon of a capitalist revolution would be utterly unfathomable 
to one whose understanding of private property was limited to a study 
of Nedelsky's book. Implicit in Nedelsky's account of our own experi-
ence is that democratic majorities in America, if liberated from the 
"distorting" effects of a Madisonian constitutional heritage, would opt 
for a more collectivist and egalitarian society. One schooled on this 
premise would predict that if democratic majorities in other countries 
- countries happily spared from these "distorting" influences - were 
suddenly freed from a dominating occupational force, they would 
adopt as their first priority guidelines for the proper distribution of 
wealth. 
Not so. They want private property. Indeed, at least some of them 
want to make property a constitutional right.27 The reasons for this 
are hardly obscure. A system of private property promises more 
goods, more jobs, more variety, more recreational and associational 
choices, more attractive communities, more economic growth - in a 
word, a larger pie.28 The former communist regimes want private 
property for all the reasons Nedelsky ignores in the latter part of her 
book. This does not mean the Commonwealth of Independent States 
and the new republics of eastern Europe will replicate the same distri-
27. See. e.g., Wiktor Osiatynski, Revolutions in Eastern Europe, 58 U. Clu. L. REv. 823, 824 
(1991) (noting that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Republic have begun to return 
property confiscated 45 years ago); Symposium, Panel L· Property Rights and the New Legal 
Order, 21 CUMB. L. REV. 447, 448-51 (1991) (panel discussion) (comments of Pavel Bratinka). 
28. See EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 3-6. 
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bution of wealth or the same balance between public and private sec-
tors found in the United States. But as I have argued, the choice of a 
private property regime is to a significant degree independent of deci-
sions about the distribution of wealth. Madison would have under-
stood last year's events very well. Nedelsky must be utterly mystified. 
IV 
The ultimate message ofNedelsky's book is that private property is 
a social institution, collectively defined and collectively enforced. She 
believes the concept of property as something natural and prepolitical 
and immune from ordinary democratic processes is at best incoherent 
and at worst pernicious. The idea that property has some timeless, 
"correct" definition that courts can ascertain and enforce against the 
popular will is belied by the fact that the idea of property has "dis-
integrated. "29 And attempts throughout our history to insulate prop-
erty from majoritarian processes - whether Madison's design for a 
structural Constitution that would ensure rule by the propertied elite 
or Lochner's strategy of-a judicially enforced protective boundary 
around property rights - have only "distorted" the process of collec-
tive self-determination, preventing the people from defining this social 
institution in the way they mutually conclude to be for the best of all. 
Property is of course a social institution, not a natural right. But 
there is no inherent contradiction, as Nedelsky seems to believe there 
is, between the idea that property is a social institution and the idea 
that the law - another social institution - should protect reliance 
interests associated with specific property rights. Property is a social 
institution in the sense that it emerges from customary forms of inter-
action among people with respect to specific material resources,30 and 
29. The idea that the concept of private property has "disintegrated" plays only a marginal 
role in Nedelsky's book, and hence warrants only a footnote. Nedelsky borrows this conceit 
from Thomas Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in XXII NoMOS: PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland 
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980), and supports it with reference to Frank Michelman's 
discussion of the Supreme Court's all-things-considered understanding of the distinction between 
a regulation and a taking of property. Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987. 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
1600 (1988). But the fact that there are hard cases at the margins of the takings doctrine hardly 
supports the claim that a legal institution has "disintegrated." Private property, in the everyday 
sense of the right to possess, exclude others, and transfer identified material resources, is non-
problematic in the vast majority of transactions in which the concept is applied. 
The notion that property has "disintegrated" is also belied by Nedelsky's own theory that 
"the image of property as natural, neutral, and apolitical or 'nonstate-like' " continues to define 
what counts as governmental interference and "who will get constitutional protection for what." 
Pp. 259-60. In effect, Nedelsky tries to have it both ways. She argues that property has dis-
integrated and thus cannot serve as a judicially defined boundary. But at the same time she 
believes that property continues to have a "mythic power'' that defines the boundaries of political 
discourse. P. 246. If property did not continue to reflect some commonsense core of meaning, it 
could hardly continue to exert such a powerful influence over the legal mind. 
30. See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
167-68 (1991) (reviewed in this issue by Professor David Friedman. - Ed.); John Umbeck, A 
Theory of Contract Choice and the California Gold Rush, 20 J. LAW & EcoN. 421 (1977); cf. 
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 51 AM. EcoN. REv. 347 (1967) (describ-
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then is defined and protected against private interference by state 
law.31 The constitutional protection of property is also a social institu-
tion, but it involves a different source of law (the federal Constitution 
rather than state law), different institutional actors (ultimately the fed-
eral courts), and different objectives (protecting specific entitlements 
against public rather than private interference). Thus, the fact that 
both processes are "social" does not mean that they collapse into a 
single undifferentiated mass. Moreover, neither the social origins of 
property as an institution, nor the social nature of the constitutional 
protections we recognize, tells us much about what collective meas-
ures may be adopted (at either the state or the federal level) to reallo-
cate relative shares of fungible wealth. We are fortunate that the 
Founders of our nation, most prominently James Madison, under-
stood these distinctions. What is puzzling is that so many contempo-
rary American academics would like to obscure them. 
ing an economic theory of why informal property rights emerge in primitive societies in response 
to external changes that effect the value of material resources). 
31. See Board ofR:egents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
